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Abstract
We derive a R&D-based growth model where the rate of technological progress depends,
inter alia, on the amount of technological opportunity. Incremental innovations provide di-
rect increases to the knowledge stock but they reduce technological opportunity and thus
the potential for further improvements. Technological opportunity is renewed by radical in-
novations, which have no direct impact on factor productivity. We study both the market
equilibrium and the social planner allocation in this economy.
Investigating the model for its implications on economic growth we find: (i) in the long
run, a balanced growth path requires that the returns to radical innovations are at least as large
as those of the incremental ones; (ii) the transition need not be monotonic. We show under
which conditions our model generates endogenous cycles via complex dynamics without re-
sorting to uncertainty; (iii) the calibrated model exhibits substantial quantitative differences
between the market outcome and the social planner allocation.
JEL Classification Numbers: E32, O30, O41.
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1 Introduction
Ideas are not alike. Some ideas provide answers to certain questions, solve some puzzles,
or at least add qualifications to the answers already known; others pose more questions than
they actually answer. Some inventions provide mankind with readily useful technologies;
others need centuries of hard intellectual work to develop. Some ideas leave loose threads
hanging – they open up the opportunity for further developments – while others tie these
hanging ends together, creating useful knowledge by taking advantage of the opportunities
created previously.
It is clear that this type of heterogeneity in ideas must have an impact on the rate of tech-
nological progress. Nonetheless, such heterogeneity has rarely been considered in the litera-
ture. Specifically, the mainstream R&D-based growth literature assumes that the amount of
newly created knowledge depends primarily on the current stock of knowledge and the num-
ber of active researchers (e.g. Romer [36], Aghion and Howitt [1], Jones [21], Li [28]), with
extensions to human capital (e.g. Strulik [41]), spillovers (e.g. Howitt [20], Li [30]), and
R&D difficulty (e.g. Segerstrom [39]). It is presumed that as long as all these ingredients are
supplied in the required quantities, the opportunity for innovations is unlimited. There does
exist however ample empirical evidence, some of which we shall review in the next section,
which suggests otherwise and points at an important role of the heterogeneity in innovations
for economic growth.
In our view, one of the serious attempts to provide a satisfying modelling approach going
in this direction has been undertaken by Olsson [32, 33]. Both articles lay the foundations
for the distinction between incremental and radical innovations, and offer a formal descrip-
tion for the concept of technological opportunity. On the downside, these two papers are
somewhat detached from standard theories of long-run economic growth and convergence
because they focus primarily on developing a set-theoretic model of ideas and explain why
technological breakthroughs tend to cluster in time. This creates a gap in the literature which
needs to be filled.
The crucial contribution of the current article is to span a bridge between the intuitive
Olsson’s theory and the mainstream literature on R&D-based semi-endogenous growth (e.g.
Romer [36], Jones [21]). We provide a common denominator for both these frameworks: our
model is general enough to make it possible to analyse the impacts of technological oppor-
tunity as well as incremental and radical innovations on long-run growth and convergence.
This article follows Olsson [33] in assuming that the R&D sector of the economy pro-
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duces incremental and radical innovations, related as follows. Incremental innovations pro-
vide direct increases to the economy’s productivity and utilize technological opportunity
opened up by radical innovations. Radical innovations extend the existing technological op-
portunity by combining previous discoveries (abstract ideas which are initially useless) with
existing knowledge. Technological opportunity behaves like a renewable resource here: it
is exhausted by incremental innovations and renewed by radical innovations. As opposed
to Olsson [33], however, our model does not rely on a linearity assumption that gives rise
to bang-bang solutions and non-smooth dynamics. In Olsson’s model, all researchers work
either in the incremental or in the radical innovation sector, but never in both at the same
time. It is clear that the assumption leading to this result is rather strong; we manage to
weaken it considerably. Our analysis confirms, however, Olsson’s results qualitatively by
signifying the importance of R&D labor re-allocations for oscillatory dynamics. In addition,
we demonstrate that:
(i) technological opportunity must be continuously renewed in order to sustain technolog-
ical progress over the long run;
(ii) if the flows of radical innovations are too small in comparison to the flows of in-
cremental innovations, technological opportunity will be gradually depleted and eco-
nomic growth will eventually come to a halt, and if radical innovations are relatively
abundant, then the volume of unused technological opportunity would tend to explode;
(iii) the transition to the balanced growth path may be oscillatory: in addition to the stan-
dard result of monotonic convergence, we obtain the possibility of complex dynam-
ics for a wide variety of parameter values. These complex dynamics can come in the
form of oscillations, converging, stable or diverging, and Andronov–Hopf bifurcations.
Thus, our model generates endogenous cycles without uncertainty.
The current article can also be viewed in comparison to the contributions by Li [28], [29],
[30] as well as Young [43], Aghion and Howitt [2], Cozzi and Galli [12], Cozzi and Galli
[13]. All these authors accounted for the heterogeneity of ideas by considering a distinction
between horizontal and vertical innovations, basic and applied research, or between tech-
nological and scientific knowledge. They posited different production technologies in both
types of R&D and acknowledged their diverse roles in driving long-run growth. However,
none of these contributions captured Olsson’s idea directly – that one of the types increases
whereas the other type decreases the stock of technological opportunity, on a one-to-one
basis.
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Perhaps the closest related contribution from this literature is Li [29] who, like us, builds
an R&D-based growth model where one type of innovations (the “scientific” one) acceler-
ates technological progress whereas the other (the “technological” one) decelerates it. Li
[29] has also analysed the patterns of oscillatory dynamics in his economy. He has, however,
assumed this type of behavior of the model directly, by positing that scientific breakthroughs
arrive in discrete jumps. In contrast, by modeling both types of innovations as smooth func-
tions of time, we are able to obtain the cyclicality result endogenously. The other important
difference is that in Li’s model, there is no variable with the properties of technological
opportunity in the sense discussed here.
When introducing different kinds of innovations into growth models, several researchers
have already suggested the possibility of cycles to occur (Aghion and Howitt [1], Cheng
and Dinopoulos [11], Amable [4], Francois and Lloyd-Ellis [14], Phillips and Wrase [35],
Jovanovic and Rob [24], Bresnahan and Trajtenberg [10], Freeman et al. [15], Alvarez-
Cuadrado et al. [3], Bramoulle and Saint-Paul [9]). However, their approaches and therefore
their implied sources of cyclical growth differ from ours. In particular, in none of these ap-
proaches does technological progress depend on an exhaustible factor, such as technological
opportunity is in our case.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. In section 2 we lay out the foun-
dations of our framework. We introduce our principal concepts and present the system of
equations determining the temporal evolution of knowledge. In section 3 we set up and solve
our growth model. We analyse both the market equilibrium and the social optimum. We then
discuss both the balanced growth path and transition dynamics and do sensitivity analysis on
the important parameters. Section 4 concludes.
2 Technological Opportunity and the Evolution of Knowl-
edge
New developments vary not only in their impact on factor productivity, but also in
their impact on the opportunity for further developments. This difference between
two innovations can manifest itself in the magnitudes of productivity increments,
but also in the magnitudes and the direction of change in the extent and efficiency
of follow-up research. There are radical developments that open new avenues of
thought and there are incremental developments that only ‘fish out’ technological
5
opportunity. Intuitively, one could look at this distinction through the lens of the
dichotomy between basic and applied research. Basic research is often carried out
in fields rather detached from day-to-day economic activity, such as plasma physics,
neurobiology, or experimental psychology, and it would typically be of little business
interest but potentially of immense interest to scientists working in related areas, able
to build up on these developments. The principal role of basic research is thus to fa-
cilitate further research, both basic and applied. Applied research, on the other hand,
would typically be based upon previous scientific developments and bring about new
opportunities to business rather than to science. It would tend to capture the oppor-
tunities created by basic research while offering relatively less scientific stimuli in
return. Applied research is vacuous without basic research, but basic research alone
cannot guarantee technological progress whose benefits everyone can experience:
applied research is the necesseary means for making productive use of the conquests
of basic science.
Radical innovation as viewed in this paper resembles basic research in the sense
presented above, while incremental innovation could be associated with applied re-
search.1 Olsson’s set-theoretic setup should be understood as a metaphor of the evo-
lution of human thought in reality. Consequently, all the concepts defined precisely
in this metaphorical world (such as technological opportunity) are supposed to have
real-world analogues. A number of examples have been listed in the Appendix of
this paper to emphasize the grounds for making such an analogy.
2.1 The Laws of Motion
Let us now clarify the notation of variables which shall be used in our growth model.
By Bt we shall denote the amount of technological opportunity at time t, by Rt the
flow of radical innovations, by Ct the flow of incremental innovations, and by At
the current stock of knowledge. Technological opportunity is increased by radical
innovations, whereas incremental innovations add to the stock of knowledge but
diminish technological opportunity. We write A˙t = Ct and B˙t = Rt − Ct (Olsson
1For precise definitions and the relationship between all these terms and the set-theoretic setup, see Olsson [32],
[33] as well as the Appendix.
6
[33]).2
The set-theoretic setup as well as an intuitive rationale3 equip us with the basic
understanding of how innovations and knowledge evolve over time, and we shall
proceed to provide a more specific characterization which would then allow us to
solve for the precise dynamic paths. To assure analytical tractability as well as com-
parability to the semi-endogenous growth literature which evolved from Jones [21],
we use standard Cobb-Douglas functional forms. They read:
A˙t = δ(ut`AtLt)
βBµt , (1)
B˙t = −δ(ut`AtLt)βBµt︸ ︷︷ ︸
incremental innovations
+ γ((1− ut)`AtLt)βAνt︸ ︷︷ ︸
radical innovations
, (2)
We denote total population by Lt and assume it to be equal to the total amount of
working time available in the economy at time t. Population is assumed to grow
exogenously at a constant rate n > 0. Then, `At is the proportion of working time
devoted to R&D, with ut`At being the proportion of time spent on working in the in-
cremental innovation sector and (1− ut)`At the time spent in the radical innovation
sector. The parameter δ > 0 is proportional to the rate at which incremental inno-
vations come about, whereas γ > 0 relates to the rate at which radical innovations
arrive. The exponents µ and ν are crucial for the dynamic behaviour of our model.
From our preceding argumentation, we know that they ought to be strictly positive.
We shall further assume that µ, ν ∈ (0, 1) (less-than-proportional external effects in
R&D) which assures non-explosive semi-endogenous growth in the long run. The
relative size of these exponents is decisive for the long-run evolution of innovations,
which we investigate in the next subsection. The parameter β > 0 measures the
degree of returns to scale with respect to employment in R&D sectors. Our assump-
tion that β ∈ (0, 1) implies decreasing returns to scale in R&D activity which are
required for positive shares of both kinds of innovation to be pursued in equilibrium
and stands in contrast to Olsson [33] who has β = 1 and thus constant returns to
scale, which leads to bang-bang solutions.
2A promising alternative, somewhat departing from the Olsson’s set-theoretic setup but also plausible empiri-
cally, would be to write B˙t = Rt/Ct. We leave this possibility for further research.
3Available in the Appendix.
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Let us now compare this setup with several standard R&D-based models of
(semi-) endogenous growth, on the one hand, and with Olsson [32, 33] on the other.
We shall see shortly that this article spans a bridge between these two frameworks
and can be reduced to either one by neglecting certain assumptions.
Romer’s [36] specification of technical change would correspond to equation (1)
only, with Bt = At and µ = 1. This leads to the scale effect discussed by Jones [21]
and implies explosive dynamics if n > 0. However, even Jones’s R&D equation,
which avoids scale effects, is only a subcase of our specification, corresponding to
equation (1) only, with Bt = At, µ < 1 and n > 0. Hence, the system (1)–(2) can
be reduced to the standard specifications of R&D equations found throughout the
economic growth literature by identifying technological opportunity with technology
itself and restricting attention to equation (1).
The two-R&D-sector model with horizontal and vertical innovation, specified by
Li [30], would correspond to a modified version of equation (1) – with an additional
spillover term going from A to A˙ but then with β = 1 – coupled with an equation
of form B˙t = (1 − ut)`AtLtAφAt BφBt . This change requires a substantial reinterpre-
tation of the B variable: it is then no longer a measure of technological opportunity,
exhausted by incremental innovations and unrelated to current factor productivity;
instead, it is a measure of average product quality, which provides direct increases to
factor productivity, and which might be negatively affected by incremental innova-
tions (Li assumes φA ≤ 0) but never depleted, thanks to the multiplicative character
of this specification.
In comparison to Olsson [33], we allow for both incremental and radical innova-
tions happening at the same time. We neglect Olsson’s linearity assumption β = 1
that gives rise to bang-bang solutions and thus abrupt reallocations of R&D work-
ers between radical and incremental R&D. We are also more specific on discoveries
fueling radical innovation by linking them to the current technology level At, with
elasticity ν.
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2.2 The Long-Run Properties
We now focus on the properties of the balanced growth path (BGP) under different
relative sizes of the exponents in the radical and incremental innovations, µ and
ν.4 We do this by finding the necessary conditions under which the growth rates of
all economic variables are constant. These conditions imply in particular that the
sectoral allocation of labor does not change over time.
Let us take equations (1)–(2) and solve for the BGP. Incremental innovations
grow at a constant rate if Aˆ = δ(u`AL)βBµ/A is constant.5 Assuming a constant ut
requires that βn+µBˆ = Aˆ. Since we assume constant population growth n > 0, then
Aˆ is constant if Bˆ is constant. A constant growth rate of technological opportunity,
Bˆ = R/B − C/B, requires that the ratios R/B and C/B are constant.
We know that C/B = δ(u`AL)βBµ/B is constant if βn + µBˆ = Bˆ, and
R/B = γ((1 − u)`AL)βAν/B is constant if βn + νAˆ = Bˆ. Both these ratios can
thus be constant simultaneously with Aˆ = Bˆ > 0 only if µ = ν. In consequence,
if the external returns from technology to radical innovations and from technologi-
cal opportunity to incremental innovations are equal, then this directly gives rise to
standard semi-endogenous growth along the lines of Jones [21].
If µ < ν, on the other hand, then we require that limt→∞{LβtBµ−1t } = 0, which
implies an asymptotic BGP where technology grows at a rate Aˆ = (1+µ)βn
1−µν and
technological opportunity – at a rate Bˆ = (1+ν)βn
1−µν . Since µ < ν we know that, on the
asymptotic BGP, technological opportunity grows faster than technology. In other
words, in the limit, technological opportunity will be driven by radical innovations
only. Furthermore, the growth rate of incremental innovations is proportional to
that of radical innovations, and the flow of radical innovations grows faster than of
incremental ones. If limt→∞{LβtBµ−1t } > 0 then we obtain that limt→∞ Bˆ = 1+ν1+µAˆ,
suggesting again that technological opportunity B grows at a proportional and faster
rate than technology A.
In the last case, where µ > ν, we obtain that limt→∞ A˙ = B˙ = B = 0. Thus,
4When we refer to semi-endogenous growth, we mean R&D-based growth which is ultimately driven by popu-
lation growth. See e.g. Jones [21].
5Throughout the article, we shall use the notation: Xˆ ≡ X˙/X .
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even though technological opportunity is renewed by radical innovations, the effect
of its depletion due to more efficient incremental innovations is dominant in the long
run. Growth comes to a halt in the limit.6
In consequence, we find that long-run predictions along the lines of Jones [21],
Kortum [26], Segerstrom [38] or Peretto [34] may hold only in the case where the
extents of external returns to incremental innovations are less or equal to those of
radical innovations. Since the current literature compares the model predictions with
historical time paths of R&D expenditures and factor productivities, with the single
dynamical equation of technology in mind, our results suggest that one should be
more cautious with those predictions. When technological opportunity is viewed as
the driving force behind actual technology, then it could very well be that the empir-
ical literature misses the influence of the evolution of technological opportunity on
effective technological progress and thus runs into systematic error.
Conclusively, a necessary condition for obtaining semi-endogenous growth as in
Jones [21] within our model requires µ ≥ ν. In the following section, we study
the model under its most transparent parametrization µ = ν, consistent with a BGP.
One of our main findings is that even the optimal allocation of such a model can
be subject to oscillations. Our model is thus able to span a bridge from the cyclical
paths of Olsson to the monotonic dynamics of Jones or Romer.
3 The Model
We embed the dynamical equations analysed above in a semi-endogenous growth
model and study both its decentralized equilibrium and its social planner solution.
Our interest is to understand the ways in which consumption is allocated across time,
and labor is divided between all sectors of the economy. We will also compare both
allocations to see which of the resultant tradeoffs are “generic” to the model, and
which are specific to one of the considered allocations.
As far as the intertemporal consumption decision is concerned, our approach is
6These results are preserved if one allows for different β parameters in the two R&D sectors. We shall abstract
from this unnecessary complexity throughout the remainder of the article.
10
based on the standard framework where the infinitely-lived representative agent ob-
tains utility from the discounted stream of the unique consumption good. The utility
function takes the usual CRRA form: u(c) = c
1−θ−1
1−θ , with θ > 0 being the inverse
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption.7 Moreover, we shall
assume a standard Cobb-Douglas production function which takes as inputs: tech-
nology A with elasticity σ, physical capital K with elasticity α, and labor (1− `A)L
with elasticity 1 − α. Technology accumulates faster the more labor is allocated
to research, but its underlying ability to accumulate is constrained by technologi-
cal opportunity. The market equilibrium will be computed in an increasing variety
framework similar to the one in Jones [22], where the capital input in final goods
production is composed of a continuum of measure A of imperfectly substitutable
intermediate goods. The monopolistic profits accrued from producing those goods
provide the incentive for R&D firms to pursue incremental research, resulting in
inventing new varieties, A˙.
Given the assumption that innovations are heterogenous, however, in the decen-
tralized allocation we have to specify the markets which would assign prices to both
incremental and radical innovations. The former provide direct increases to aggre-
gate productivity by increasing the mass of capital goods varieties A, and therefore
their pricing will be based on the discounted stream of monopoly profits attained
by capital goods producers. Radical innovations, on the other hand, do not provide
increases in aggregate productivity and are only indirectly useful for the economy.
Hence, their pricing has to be based on the evaluation of these indirect impacts. We
achieve this by decomposing the process of incremental innovation into three con-
secutive steps, introducing monopolistic competition in an analogous way as in the
case of the assembly of physical capital. We shall assume that, to produce incre-
mental innovations, one has to assemble an infinity of mass B of imperfectly substi-
tutable intermediate ideas, each of them produced monopolistically by a technolog-
ical opportunity explorer. Then, there is free entry to radical innovation, increasing
the mass B of technological opportunities to be explored.
As suggested previously, we shall concentrate on the case of µ = ν here. We
impose this restrictive condition for analytical tractability and comparability to the
7In the special case θ = 1, the formula is replaced with u(c) = ln c.
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semi-endogenous growth literature.
3.1 The Decentralized Equilibrium
The decentralized market equilibrium is shaped by the decisions of households, final
goods producers, intermediate goods producers, and R&D firms. We shall discuss
their optimization problems in that order and then define and compute the general
equilibrium.
3.1.1 Households
Households maximize utility subject to wealth accumulation.
max
ct
∫ ∞
0
L0
c1−θt − 1
1− θ e
−(ρ−n)tdt, (3)
subject to
a˙t = (rt − n)at + wt − ct. (4)
Labor is supplied inelastically (one unit of labor per person) and there is an ex post
uniform wage rate wt across all occupations due to wage arbitrage. at represents
household wealth at time t, ρ > 0 is the discount rate, θ > 0 is the coefficient of
relative risk aversion, and L0 the initial population amount that grows at rate n > 0.
We take consumption to be the numeraire. Hence, the optimal consumption path
follows the standard Euler equation:
gc ≡ c˙t
ct
=
rt − ρ
θ
. (5)
3.1.2 The Final Goods Sector
The final goods sector solves
max
xit,`At
(∫ A
0
xϕitdi
)α
ϕ
((1− `At)Lt)1−α − wt((1− `At)Lt)−
∫ A
0
qitxitdi. (6)
Here, xit are intermediate inputs produced by firm i at time t, A refers to the number
of varieties, qit is the cost of using intermediate input xit, and the parameter ϕ ∈
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(0, 1) describes the complementarity of intermediate inputs whereas α ∈ (0, 1) is
the share of intermediate inputs in final output.
With symmetric inputs, xt = xit, and the total amount of intermediate inputs (or
simply capital) is equal to
∫ A
0
xitdi = Kt. The total production of final goods is then
Yt = A
σ
tK
α
t ((1 − `At)Lt)1−α, where σ = α(1 − ϕ)/ϕ. Maximization leads to the
demand function for intermediate inputs xit given by:
x(qit) =
(
α
Y
qit
∫ A
0
xϕitdi
) 1
1−ϕ
. (7)
Hence, unit price of xit equals:
qit = α
Y
K
, (8)
with Ax = K being the capital resource constraint. Optimal wages are given by
wt = (1− α)Aσt kαt (1− `At)−α. (9)
3.1.3 Capital Goods Producers
Firms producing capital goods solve:
max
qit
Πit = (qit − rt − d)x(qit), (10)
where d > 0 denotes the depreciation rate of capital inputs, rt the interest rate, and
x(qit) the demand given price qit. We thus obtain that the optimal rental rate qit
equals, by symmetry,
qit = qt =
rt + d
ϕ
. (11)
Combining (8) with (11) gives the interest rate rt:
rt = ϕα
Yt
Kt
− d. (12)
Since ϕ ∈ (0, 1), we know that interest is less than the marginal product of capital.
By combining (7) with (11) we get an equilibrium demand of x given by
x =
(
αϕY
A1−ϕKϕ(r + d)
) 1
1−ϕ
=
K
A
. (13)
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Profits of the firm selling variety i are then
ΠAit = Πt = (1− ϕ)(rt + d)x/ϕ = (1− ϕ)α
Y
A
. (14)
The no-arbitrage condition describes the equilibrium dynamics of the price of a
patent pAt:
rt =
Πit
pAt
+
p˙At
pAt
. (15)
The supply of patents is determined by the R&D sector.
3.1.4 Incremental Innovations
As mentioned above, we shall assume that incremental innovations are worth pAt in
patents for new intermediate capital goods to be produced monopolistically. They
are in turn produced in a competitive market where R&D firms assemble an infinity
of mass Bt of imperfectly substitutable intermediate ideas, whose quantities are de-
noted by χit, with i ∈ [0, B].8 For each intermediate idea used in the R&D process,
incremental innovators are charged a licence fee in the form of a per-unit royalty
zit, paid to technological opportunity explorers. This assumption is consistent with
real-world practice because per-unit royalties are the predominant means of making
8As an example, consider an incremental innovator who designs a new type of software. As an intermediate
input, he requires a programming code that is only a marginal innovation (i.e., requires a small quantity of this
particular intermediate idea), or he could need one that is very complex and touches the bounds of current knowledge
(i.e., requires a lot of this intermediate idea). A technological opportunity explorer, in this example a software
programmer, would then write such a code and sell it to the incremental innovator. Nevertheless, by itself, the
code is not directly useful. Thus, we suggest that intermediate ideas by themselves do not advance technology.
In our model, incremental innovators perform the role of bundling together these intermediate ideas into an actual
incremental innovation that is useful for the real sector. Analogous examples of intermediate ideas could be, e.g.,
designs of machine parts, production processes, or partial solutions to complex analytical or numerical problems.
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profit of ideas.9 Thus, incremental innovators solve
max
χit
{
pAtB
ψ−1
ψ
t
(∫ Bt
0
χψitdi
) 1
ψ
−
∫ Bt
0
zitχitdi
}
, ψ ∈ (0, 1). (16)
The iso-elastic demand curve for quantities of intermediate ideas χit is thus given
as:
χ(zit) =
pAtB
ψ−1
ψ
t
(∫ Bt
0
χψitdi
) 1−ψ
ψ
zit

1−ψ
. (17)
In the symmetric equilibrium, where χit = χt for all i ∈ [0, Bt], the above pricing
scheme reduces to zit = zt = pAt. The total volume of incremental innovation
equals Btχt ≡ A˙t.
Thus, technological opportunity explorers charge a licence fee that, in the sym-
metric equilibrium, is equivalent to a per-unit royalty on the production of incremen-
tal innovations, and takes all the rent away from incremental innovators.
3.1.5 Technological Opportunity Explorers
Each intermediate idea i ∈ [0, Bt] in the technological opportunity set is explored
monopolistically by a technological opportunity explorer who maximizes profits
by setting an optimal licence fee zit given the iso-elastic demand curve specified
above. Technological opportunity explorers hire labor against the equilibrium wage
wt which they view as exogenous. Hence, the optimization problem becomes:
max
zit
ΠBit = zitχ(zit)−
wtut`AtLt
Bt
= χ(zit)
(
zit − wt
ξtBt
)
, (18)
9The theoretical literature suggests that it is optimal for an outside firm to charge a fixed fee for an idea (Kamien
and Tauman [25]). However, under asymmetric information (Beggs [7]), or in case a cost-reducing innovation is
non-drastic (Wang [42]), per-unit royalties should be preferred. On the empirical side, Rostoker [37] surveyed
corporations and found that 39% demand a royalty, while 46% demand a mix between royalty and downpayment.
Macho-Stadler et al. [31] found that in 59% of all contracts a royalty payment is demanded, while Bousquet et al.
[8] observed this in 78% of contracts. The main difference between our approach and this literature is that, in our
case, the incremental idea is not a cost-reducing idea (Kamien and Tauman [25]) but a necessary input of the R&D
process.
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where the last equality follows from the assumed specification of technology:
χit = (ut`AtLt)ξt, (19)
with ξt = δ(ut`AtLt)β−1B
µ−1
t considered exogenous. At the level of the given tech-
nological opportunity explorer, the technology is thus viewed as linear, even though
it will be concave and increasing with Bt in the aggregate. The optimal choice of the
per-unit royalty zit yields:
zit =
wt
ψξtBt
. (20)
Hence, under symmetry, each opportunity explorer’s profit equals:
ΠBit = Π
B
t =
wt
ξtBt
(
1− ψ
ψ
)
χt =
(
1− ψ
ψ
)
wtut`AtLt
Bt
. (21)
Combining this with the equilibrium wage set in (9), we obtain the following
equation specifying the incremental innovation patent price pAt:
pAt = zt =
wt
ψξtBt
=
1
ψ
· wtut`AtLt
A˙t
=
1
ψ
· (1− α)Ytut`At
(1− `At)A˙t
. (22)
3.1.6 Radical Innovations
We assume a competitive market for radical innovations, with firms hiring labor for
the competitive wage wt and selling patents for each newly produced technological
opportunity B˙t to technological opportunity explorers for the price pBt. The value
of patents pBt comes from the fact that technological opportunity explorers exert
monopoly power and earn positive profits in the form of licence fees. The discounted
stream of these profits determines pBt in equilibrium. Assuming free entry, we have:
pBtB˙t = wt(1− ut)`AtLt, (23)
where B˙t = −δ(ut`AtLt)βBµt + γ((1− ut)`AtLt)βAµt . For simplicity, we ignore the
problem of net destruction of technological opportunity if B˙t < 0 here because at the
BGP and in its vicinity, Bt will be growing over time. Therefore we do not have to
consider the case where patents for technological opportunity explorers are finitely
lived.
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Combining equations (22)–(23), we obtain:
ut
1− ut =
ψpAtA˙t
pBtB˙t
, (24)
and thus at the BGP, both pA and pB grow at the same rate g + n− Aˆ.
Finally, patents on radical innovations have to follow the usual no-arbitrage con-
dition:
rt =
ΠBt
pBt
+
p˙Bt
pBt
. (25)
3.1.7 The Market Equilibrium
The decentralized equilibrium consists of allocations {ct, `At, ut, at, {xit}, {χit}, Yt, Kt,
{ΠAit}, {ΠBit}Lt, At, Bt}∞0 with prices {wt, rt, {qit}, {zit}, pAt, pBt}∞0 such that we
obtain for all t, that ct, at solve the household’s maximization problem; {xit} and `At
solve the final good sector’s problem; qit and ΠAit solve the capital goods sector prob-
lem; {χit} and ut`At solve the intermediate innovation sector’s problem; zit and ΠBit
solve the technological opportunity explorers’ problem; there is free entry into the
radical innovation sector; the capital market clears with atLt = Kt+pAtAt+pBtBt;
the labor market clears with ut`At + (1−ut)`At + (1− `At) = 1; the capital resource
constraint satisfies
∫ A
0
xitdi = Kt; the intermediate idea resource constraint satisfies∫ B
0
χitdi = A˙t; assets have equal returns given by rt =
ΠAit
pAt
+ p˙At
pAt
=
ΠBit
pBt
+ p˙Bt
pBt
.
3.1.8 The Balanced Growth Path
As it is usual with semi-endogenous growth models, growth rates of all major vari-
ables c, k, y, A,B along the BGP can be computed using the appropriate production
functions only, and they will not depend on any endogenous variables. Hence, they
will also necessarily be the same in the decentralized and in the social planner allo-
cation.
Solving for the BGP yields the following long-run growth rate of the economy:
g ≡ yˆ = kˆ = cˆ = σ
1− α
βn
1− µ, (26)
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whereas the long-run growth rates of technology and technological opportunity are
Aˆ = Bˆ =
βn
1− µ. (27)
As expected from the previous section, technological opportunity and technology
grow at a common rate, and consumption, income and capital grow at a rate being
a multiple of this rate. The transversality condition of the optimization requires that
n < ρ + (θ − 1)g, and the R&D problem does not add any more conditions on top
of that, provided that the economy is in the decentralized equilibrium.
While the differences between the decentralized equilibrium and the optimal al-
location cannot be found in growth rates, they will certainly appear in the levels of
(appropriately detrended) variables at the BGP. To compare these, we shall rewrite
the system in terms of the six following variables which are stationary on the BGP:
{c/k, u, `A, y/k, A/B,Lβ/A1−µ}. We shall denote X ≡ A/B and Y ≡ Lβ/A1−µ.
The superscript d indicates that we are dealing with the decentralized equilibrium.
The appropriate formulas for the BGP are the following:
1− ud
ud
=
1− ϕ
1− α ·
1− ψ
ψ
·G, (28)
1− `dA
`dA
= ud · 1− α
(1− ϕ)αψG, (29)
Xd + 1 =
γ
δ
(
1− ud
ud
)β
(Xd)µ+1, (30)(y
k
)d
=
1
αϕ
(θg + d+ ρ) , (31)( c
k
)d
=
1
αϕ
(θg + d+ ρ)− g − d− n, (32)
Y d =
Lβ
A1−µ
=
βn
(1− µ)δ(ud`dA)β
(Xd)µ. (33)
We used the shorthand notation:
G ≡ Aˆ
Aˆ+ (θ − 1)g − n+ ρ =
βn
1−µ
βn
1−µ + (θ − 1) σ1−α βn1−µ − n+ ρ
.
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Equation (30) defines the unique solution for Xd since the left-hand side in-
creases linearly from limX→0(X + 1) = 1 to limX→∞(X + 1) = +∞. The
right-hand side increases in a strictly convex manner from limX→0 cXµ+1 = 0 to
limX→∞ cXµ+1 = +∞. Since both sides are continuous, there necessarily exists a
unique, positive point in which they intersect.
All other equations provide explicit formulas for all variables which are station-
ary along the BGP. We shall now compare these formulas to their counterparts in the
social planner allocation.
3.2 The Social Planner Problem
We will now proceed to a description of the optimal allocation in the considered
economy.
3.2.1 Setup
The maximization problem of the social planner looks as follows.
max
{c,u,`A;k,A,B}∞t=0
L0
∫ ∞
0
c1−θ − 1
1− θ e
−(ρ−n)tdt subject to: (34)
y = Aσkα(1− `A)1−α, (35)
k˙ = y − c− (d+ n)k, (36)
A˙ = δ(u`AL)
βBµ, (37)
B˙ = [−δuβBµ + γ(1− u)βAµ](`AL)β, (38)
L = L0e
nt, n > 0, (39)
L0, k0, A0, B0 given.
The parameter restrictions are 0 < n < ρ, necessary to guarantee a positive effective
discount rate, and σ, α, β, d ∈ (0, 1) as well as θ, µ, δ, γ > 0.10 µ < 1 is required to
guarantee positive semi-endogenous growth in the long-run. d is the instantaneous
depreciation rate of physical capital.
10In the special case θ = 1, the utility function is replaced with u(c) = ln c.
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3.2.2 The Balanced Growth Path
Maximizing the Hamiltonian associated with the above optimization problem and
solving for the BGP yields the following long-run growth rate of the economy:
g ≡ yˆ = kˆ = cˆ = σ
1− α
βn
1− µ, (40)
whereas the long-run growth rates of technology and technological opportunity are
(as in Jones [21])
Aˆ = Bˆ =
βn
1− µ. (41)
As anticipated, all these growth rates coincide with the ones obtained in the decen-
tralized equilibrium. All transversality conditions boil down to the single require-
ment that n < ρ+ (θ − 1)g, the same one as in the decentralized economy.
Denoting the steady-state ratio of technology to technological opportunity A/B
by X , we find that the optimal share of incremental research effort relative to radical
research effort is:
1− u∗
u∗
= µG(X∗ + 1) (42)
where X∗ ≡ (A/B)∗ solves the following implicit equation:11(γ
δ
) 1
1−β
(µG)
β
1−β (X∗)
1+µ
1−β = 1 +X∗. (43)
Equation (43) always has a unique positive solution. The asterisk indicates that we
are dealing with the socially optimal allocation.
Furthermore, we find that the optimal share of labor allocated to R&D along the
BGP solves
1− `∗A
`∗A
=
(1− α)µ
βσ
(
(X∗ + 1)
u∗
1− u∗ − 1
)
. (44)
The interpretation of these results is as follows. The optimal allocation of labor to-
wards R&D is increasing in n, but decreasing in ρ and θ. A higher population growth
11In the social planner problem, G = Aˆ
Aˆ+(θ−1)g−n+ρ is interpreted as the BGP growth rate of the shadow value
of (incremental or radical) innovations, G = Aˆ+ λˆA = Bˆ + λˆB .
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rate n implies an optimally higher ratio of technology to technological opportunity
which requires a greater proportion of workers to be allocated to the research sector.
The less important the future or the larger the incentives for consumption smoothing
the more labor will be diverted to the production sector.
The technology parameters α, σ and µ increase `∗A if ρ > (1−β)n. A sufficiently
high β implies that this inequality holds and that the returns to adding more labor to
R&D outweigh the costs of foregoing higher current consumption.
3.3 Comparing the Market Equilibrium to the Social Optimum
3.3.1 Qualitative Results
Several findings stand out when the market equilibrium is compared to the social
optimum. First of all, equations (31) and (32) differ with respect to their socially
optimal counterparts (not shown) only by the ϕ parameter, measuring the extent of
the proportional markup in the monopolistically competitive market for intermediate
capital goods, which does not appear in the optimal allocation. Hence, this distortion
implies that both the c/k and y/k ratios are “too high” in the market equilibrium, as
the monopolistic profit margin tends to slow down the accumulation of capital.
Secondly, equation (33) has an identical counterpart in the social planner alloca-
tion, but the actual values of Y will likely differ because of the possible differences
in `A, u and X between both allocations.
Thirdly, equation (30) has its social planner counterpart in the form of equation
(43). The solutions for Xd and X∗ will only differ if there are differences in ud and
u∗ or `dA and `
∗
A.
Thus, the main differences between the social planner allocation and the market
equilibrium arise through the allocation of labor across the three sectors: production,
incremental R&D, and radical R&D. As regards `A, it is possible to derive from
equation (44) of the centralized equilibrium an equation analogous to (29). It takes
the form:12
1− `∗A
`∗A
=
(1− α)ϕ
(1− ϕ)αβ
(
1
G
− µ
)
, (45)
12Note that σ = α 1−ϕϕ ⇔ ϕ = αα+σ .
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while we can re-write equations (28) and (29) as
1− `dA
`dA
=
1− α
(1− ϕ)α ·
1
G
· (1− α)
(1− α)ψ + (1− ψ)(1− ϕ)G. (46)
In general, the ordering of `∗A and `
d
A is ambiguous. However, the parameters defining
the mark-ups turn out to be crucial for the ordering. The closerϕ is to zero, the higher
the returns to technology in production and the higher the mark-up in the production
of the final goods. For sufficiently low ϕ, one obtains unambiguously `dA < `
∗
A. Thus,
a sufficiently high complementarity in intermediate inputs, effectively constraining
physical capital accumulation in the decentralized allocation, guarantees that the
social planner would allocate relatively more labor to the production of new varieties.
Furthermore, the parameter ψ plays an important role in the decentralized model
as well. A high substitution parameter ψ leads to low profits from incremental in-
novations which drives equilibrium wages down and thus increases the incentive to
have more workers in the final goods sector. The higher is ψ the higher is `dA, if
ϕ > α. This last condition arises as ϕ drives down monopolistic profits while α
increases them. This effect is absent in the social optimum because there are no
monopoly rents to extract.
As regards the allocation of workers between incremental and radical R&D, from
equations (28) and (42) we find that the term 1−ϕ
1−α · 1−ψψ present in the decentralized
case is replaced by µ(X∗ + 1) in the socially planned economy. We interpret this in
the following way: whereas in the decentralized equilibrium, the allocation of R&D
workers across sectors is driven by the relative price of patents due to incremental
and radical R&D, the optimal allocation takes directly the technological constraints
as given by the current ratio of technology to technological opportunity into account.
Furthermore, the term µ is absent from the decentralized case because opportunity
explorers view their production function as linear and fail to notice their external
negative impact on the aggregate R&D output.
3.3.2 Calibration
To provide our comparisons with a quantitative edge, let us now assign baseline
values to all parameters in our model. The market equilibrium is calibrated on the
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basis of equations (28) through (33), whereas the social planner calibration is based
on equations (42), (43), (44), and three equations analogous to (31)–(33).13 To bring
our numerical example as close to reality as possible, we shall pick these values
within a calibration exercise. Our approach is as follows.
Table 1: The baseline calibration.
δ γ β n θ d α σ ρ µ ϕ ψ
2 2 0.5 0.015 1 0.05 0.36 0.144 0.03 0.9 0.714 0.9
First of all, in line with historical data and previous calibration exercises, we
choose the benchmark parameters n = 0.015, ρ = 0.03, d = 0.05, θ = 1 and
α = 0.36 (see Kydland and Prescott [27], Steger [40], and Jones [23]). Furthermore,
relying on the empirical evidence in Basu [6], we choose ϕ = 0.714, which implies
a mark-up of 1.4. This leads to σ = α 1−ϕ
ϕ
= 0.144.
Secondly, the parameters β and µ are assumed to solve g = σ
(1−α)
βn
1−µ , where
g = 0.017 is the historical US real growth rate net of population growth.14 This
allows us to solve for one parameter as the function of the other. We then choose
β to target the observed ratios of y/k and c/k (where we follow the literature and
assume them to be good approximations of the steady state). We find that β = 0.5
leads to µ = 0.9 and steady state ratios c/k = 0.26 and y/k = 0.33, which are
reasonably close to their currently observed values (c/k = 0.25 and y/k = 0.29).
Thirdly, our calibration implies a steady-state savings rate of s = 0.21, precisely
in line with the observed savings rate (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin [5]). In addition,
we choose ψ = 0.9, leading to a steady state labor allocation in the research sector of
`A = 0.12, which slightly overshoots the observed ratio of `dA = 0.1 (see Jones [21]).
Our calculations finally lead to an incremental R&D share of ud = 0.99, and thus
almost all researchers will be allocated to incremental research in the decentralized
equilibrium.
13They are not shown and correspond to the relevant equations characterizing the market solution, only with
ϕ = 1.
14This is the average real GDP growth rate minus the population growth rate in 1947-2010, based on data from
the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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Further parameters, γ and δ, have never been discussed in the literature. Thus,
we pick them at arbitrary plausible values and then perform sensitivity analysis over
these values. All the calibrated parameters are listed in Table 1. Since only γ and
δ are chosen arbitrarily, we investigate their effects in the next section. However,
as it can be seen in Table 2, neither of them drives the standard macroeconomic
variables along the BGP and they only affect the allocation of labor between radical
and incremental research in the social planner allocation.
3.3.3 Quantitative Results
The results of this baseline calibration are depicted in Table 2, which shows clear
differences between the market equilibrium and the social planner case. Particularly
significant are the differences in the steady-state saving rate, with the social plan-
ner’s saving rate being almost three times higher than the one we see in the market
equilibrium, leading to a much lower consumption-capital ratio than the market equi-
librium suggests. Additionally, though the amount of labor delegated to the R&D
sector is approximately the same in both cases, the social planner would allocate
much less labor to incremental innovations and more to radical ones. This would
lead to a much lower steady state ratio of incremental innovations to technological
opportunity.
Additionally, we include comparative statics in Table 2. They are helpful to un-
derstand the workings of the analysed model. A “+” means that an increase in a
given parameter raises the given steady-state value, whereas a “–” means it low-
ers it. 0 denotes no impact. These comparative statics hold in the vicinity of our
baseline calibration. Also, we only changed those parameters that could be changed
independently without changing the values of the other parameters (see above).
Several particularly noteworthy facts should be emphasized here:
(i) Technological opportunity plays a similar role to savings. In particular, in-
creases in the discount rate ρ and reductions in the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution in consumption 1/θ reduce both the savings rate and technological
opportunity relative to technology.
(ii) The β parameter, measuring returns to scale in R&D, influences the steady-
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Table 2: The market equilibrium and the social planner allocations
g Aˆ y
k
c
k
s A
B
Lβ
A1−µ u `A
ME 0.017 0.075 0.33 0.26 0.21 22.18 5.66 0.99 0.012
SP 0.017 0.075 0.12 0.05 0.6 2.82 1.09 0.78 0.01
θ 0/0 0/0 +/+ +/+ -/- +/+ +/+ +/+ -/-
ρ 0/0 0/0 +/+ +/+ -/- +/+ +/+ +/+ -/-
n +/+ +/+ +/+ +/+ +/+ -/- +/+ -/- +/+
γ 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 -/- -/- 0/+ 0/0
δ 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 +/+ -/- 0/+ 0/0
ψ 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 +/0 +/0 +/0 +/0
Explanation: The market equilibrium (ME), and the social planner (SP) allocation – the first
comparative statics denote the impact on ME, the second ones that on SP.
state variables in the same way as the µ parameter, measuring the extent of
external effects in R&D.
(iii) Increases in the population growth rate raise long-run growth rates, but reduce
the level of de-trended technology. The ratio of technology to technological
opportunity is decreased as well. Relatively more technological opportunity
goes then together with an increase in overall R&D labor share.
(iv) Changes in γ and δ do not impact the optimal allocation of labor in the mar-
ket equilibrium and only impact the allocation of labor between radical and
incremental innovations in the social planner case.
(v) The parameter ψ, related to the mark-up in the incremental innovation sector,
impacts labor allocations ud and `dA positively in the market equilibrium. This
mark-up is absent in the social planner case.
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3.4 The Transition
In this section we shall analyse the transition dynamics of our model around the
balanced growth path. We derive the dynamical equations for variables which are
stationary along the BGP. Hence, our system is going to be rewritten in terms of the
six following variables: {c/k, u, `A, y/k, A/B,Lβ/A1−µ}. We shall again denote
X ≡ A/B, and use also the notation Y ≡ Lβ/A1−µ. There are three choice-like
variables, c/k, u, `A, and three state-like variables: y/k,X, Y .
The transition dynamics are fully characterized by the following dynamical sys-
tem.
ĉ/k =
(α
θ
− 1
) y
k
− d+ ρ
θ
+
c
k
+ d+ n (47)
ŷ/k = σδ(u`A)
βX−µY + (α− 1)(y
k
− c
k
− d− n)− (1− α)
(
`A
1− `A
)
ˆ`
A (48)
Xˆ = δ(u`A)
βX−µY + δ(u`A)βX1−µY − γ((1− u)`A)βXY (49)
Yˆ = βn− (1− µ)δ(u`A)βX−µY (50)
uˆ = −(1− u)
1− β
{
µXˆ +
[
βσ
1− α
(
1− `A
u`A
)
− µX
(
1 +
γ
δ
(
1− u
u
)β−1
Xµ
)
+
+µ
(
1− u
u
)]
δ(u`A)
βX−µY
}
≡ −(1− u)
1− β · Ξ, (51)
ˆ`
A =
1
1− β + α `A1−`A
{
α
c
k
− (1− α)(d+ n) + βn+ (µ− σ)δ(u`A)βX−µY +
−µ
(
u
1− u
)
γ((1− u)`A)βXY − u · Ξ
}
. (52)
In the remainder of this section, we shall resort to numerical approximations
because the implied analytical formulas, although readily attainable, are too large to
be informative.
3.4.1 Oscillatory Dynamics
One of Olsson’s main results is that research evolves in cycles. We will now show
that cycles may obtain in our model as well, despite us not relying on Olsson’s
key linearity assumption (β = 1). The oscillatory dynamics are obtained from the
26
dynamic system (47) to (52) and using parameter values that calibrate the social
planner allocation: δ = 2, γ = 2, β = 0.512, n = 0.015, θ = 2, d = 0.04,
α = 0.36, σ = 0.3, ρ = 0.05 and µ = 0.5.15 Table 3 presents the eigenvalues of the
dynamical system after its linearization around the steady state. The two complex
eigenvalues with negative real parts imply that under our benchmark calibration,
dampened oscillations are observed.
Furthermore, the balanced growth path is saddle-path stable: there are three un-
stable eigenvalues – having positive real parts – and three stable eigenvalues. The
number of unstable roots is exactly equal to the number of choice-like variables in
the benchmark parametrization of our model, and hence there exists a unique time
path of the economy approaching its balanced growth path (or in the case of a de-
trended system, approaching its steady state).16
Table 3: Eigenvalues of the linearized system.
0.1233 + 0.0176i
0.1233 - 0.0176i
0.0557
-0.0811 + 0.0176i
-0.0811 - 0.0176i
-0.0135
Furthermore, we confirm by the means of a sensitivity analysis that such oscil-
15This calibration brings the social planner allocation of our model close to the historical data. For details we
refer the reader to Growiec and Schumacher [17].
16Indeterminacy is unambiguously ruled out here despite the fact that y/k is a function of `A which is a choice
variable. y/k is not a separate choice variable, though, since once `A is counted as a choice variable itself, there
are no degrees of freedom left for choosing y/k. In sum, once c/k, u and `A are chosen, everything else is prede-
termined. This means that there are exactly three degrees of freedom. In other words: we could have used another
variable in the de-trended system instead of y/k without altering any of the model implications and the count of
stable roots, that variable being Z = Aσkα−1 = (y/k)(1 − `A)α−1. Z is a function of predetermined variables A
and k only and is also stationary along the BGP. We would then have a system in 6 variables, c/k, `A, u,X, Y, Z,
three choice-like variables and three state-like variables, which would be completely equivalent to the system at
hand.
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lations indeed occur under a large variety of parameter choices. In contrast, occur-
rence of oscillatory dynamics is impossible in continuous-time setups with semi-
endogenous growth but without technological opportunity, such as the one of Jones
[21].17
Conclusively, if one adopts the technological opportunity approach presented
here, then this model can generate cyclical dynamics along the transition to the BGP.
The source of these cycles is found in the relative rates at which radical and incre-
mental innovations arrive.
The intuition for the oscillatory dynamics is as follows. Incremental innovations
at the same time reduce technological opportunity and improve actual technology.
This technology then feeds back into radical innovations which increase technolog-
ical opportunity. If radical innovations come at amounts lower than that of incre-
mental innovations, then the increases in technological opportunity are small, and
smaller than the reductions through incremental innovations. This leads to a mono-
tonic convergence of the optimal ratioA/B to the steady-state value from above. On
the contrary, if radical innovations come at relatively large amounts, then the same
mechanism leads to convergence ofA/B from below. In the case radical innovations
arrive at some intermediate number, then the improvements in technological oppor-
tunity will be counterbalanced by the reductions through incremental innovations at
an amount which makes the ratio of actual technology to technological opportunity
fluctuate and converge to the steady-state value of A/B in a non-monotonic manner.
We can therefore conclude that growth in our model is subject to R&D-induced
fluctuations around a trend which is ultimately driven by population growth.
3.4.2 A Comparison to the Literature
Our result of oscillatory dynamics ought to be compared to the predictions found in
previous literature. The following list of contributions is obviously not exhaustive18;
it only serves to illustrate the differences between our approach and the other ones.
17Haruyama [18] shows however that in discrete time, endogenous cycles may arise as long-run equilibria even
in very standard R&D-based models, both of fully endogenous and semi-endogenous growth.
18Our focus here is primarily on technology and innovations. Other sources of fluctuations include uncertainty
(e.g. Kydland and Prescott [27]), preferences (Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. [3]), different production technologies, etc.
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We have also grouped together articles where cycles are generated through chan-
nels which are broadly the same. In these articles, the main sources of oscillatory
dynamics are:
(i) the relationship between wage costs, population growth, and profits (Goodwin
[16]; Francois and Lloyd-Ellis [14]). If growth is high, then unemployment
falls, raising wages and decreasing profits. When growth is lower than popu-
lation growth, this leads to a recession, increases unemployment and starts the
cycle again;
(ii) creative destruction (Aghion and Howitt [1]; Cheng and Dinopoulos [11]; Am-
able [4]; Francois and Lloyd-Ellis [14]; Phillips and Wrase [35]);
(iv) monopoly profits accrued from the distinction between fundamental and sec-
ondary innovations (Jovanovic and Rob [24]; Cheng and Dinopoulos [11]).
These models are based on a similar distinction as our model is. Effectively
though, the fluctuations in monopoly profits are the actual source of cycles;
(v) General Purpose Technologies – GPTs (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg [10]; Help-
man and Trajtenberg [19], Freeman et al. [15]). GPTs are assumed to have the
property that before they can be applied, costly adaptation to them is required.
This reduces economic growth in the short run but increases it afterwards;
(vi) discrete time (Haruyama [18]). Some continuous-time models leading to a uni-
form convergence to a steady state may start exhibit limit cycles when rewrit-
ten in discrete time. This applies in particular to the increasing-variety R&D-
based endogenous growth model and the R&D-based semi-endogenous growth
model;
(vii) linearity and discrete scientific breakthroughs (Li [29], Olsson [33]). Due to
the Olsson’s linearity assumption, labor is either fully allocated to radical or
to incremental research. The interplay between these two types of innovations
leads to cycles just like in our model, but it does so through the bang-bang
labour allocation and discrete jumps in technological opportunity. In Li [29]
discrete jumps in scientific knowledge are simply assumed.
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Unlike all these works, our model generates smooth endogenous cycles through
the interplay between currently available knowledge and technological opportunity.
Because of the sources as well as the nature of cycles in our model, it cannot be
considered a member of any of the groups (i)-(vii).
3.5 Sensitivity Analysis and Andronov–Hopf Bifurcations
We wish to provide further analysis of the complex dynamics by doing some com-
parative statics with respect to the decisive parameters. As is visible in Figure 1,
complex eigenvalues and thus oscillations occur for an intermediate range of arrival
rates of the radical innovations relative to incremental innovations (ceteris paribus).
Moreover, the oscillation frequency and thus the length of the cycles depends on the
γ/δ ratio, with a maximum frequency appearing around γ/δ = 1 (in the Figure, this
corresponds to γ = δ = 2). Even though not decisive for the growth rate, these two
arrival rates are decisive for the transition.
To take the analysis of the model’s dynamics a step further, we shall now discuss
the consequences of varying the returns-to-scale parameter β in its range (0, 1], as
presented in Figure 2.19 In such case, not only dampened oscillations appear but also
limit cycles. We identify an Andronov–Hopf bifurcation.
As can be seen in Figure 2, as long as β < 0.96569, greater returns to scale in
R&D imply faster convergence to the BGP but also oscillations of higher frequency.
When β crosses the threshold value of 0.96569 from below, the relevant conjugate
eigenvalues have their real parts crossing zero from below and there emerges a limit
cycle. This means that we observe an Andronov–Hopf bifurcation. The intuition
for this result is the following. If returns to scale in the R&D sector are reduced
fast (low β), convergence to the BGP is monotonic, because R&D output is quickly
becoming less and less responsive to labour reallocations. This curbs the incentives
to constantly reallocate researchers across the two R&D sectors and thus eliminates
fluctuations. If β is larger then dampened oscillations appear, and their frequency
increases with β. If returns to scale in R&D are high or close to constant, then
incentives to reallocate labour a re very strong, and oscillations become persistent.
19All other parameters are set at their benchmark values.
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Figure 1: Oscillatory dynamics. The effect of varying δ, holding γ = 2 fixed.
Figure 2: Changes in dynamics following changes in β. The Andronov–Hopf bifurcation appears
around β ≈ 0.96569.
Obviously, as we noticed above, the intuition for cycles does not only depend on
the returns to scale to labour in the R&D sector, but also requires the two kinds of
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innovations to come in approximately similar amounts.
We also notice that the Olsson’s initial intuition for obtaining persistent cycles,
namely the linearity assumption which he imposes (here it corresponds to β = 1),
was correct. However, as we demonstrate, β = 1 is not a necessary condition for
cycles in our setup. Indeed, optimal permanent cycles occur already for less-than-
constant returns to scale in R&D, β < 1, although given our baseline parameters, β
needs to be close to 1.20 Obviously, the higher is population growth, the lower the
minimum value of β which leads to permanent cycles.
Figure 3: Changes in dynamics following changes in µ. When β = 0.97, the Andronov–Hopf
bifurcation appears around µ ≈ 0.56.
As suggested, even though oscillations may occur for rather low values of β,
it seems that a necessary condition for limit cycles is a high value of β. It is not
sufficient, however. To see that, let us assign β with a value of 0.97, close to the
bifurcation value discussed above, and check the consequences of varying the R&D
spillover parameter µ, as in Figure 3. We find that the larger is the spillover parame-
ter µ, the slower are the oscillations, and for sufficiently large values (here µ > 0.85)
oscillations disappear completely. The Andronov-Hopf bifurcation occurs again and
is identified at µ ≈ 0.56. A smaller µ suggests a relatively higher importance of
labour for the creation of innovations, which implies that the preferences of the so-
20This finding, of course, does not exclude the possibility that other parameter values lead to bifurcations for
values of β significantly below 1.
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cial planner have a larger influence over the path of innovations (which we confirm
below). On the contrary, the larger is µ the more important become the relative
amounts of technology and technological opportunity.
Figure 4: Changes in dynamics following changes in the discount rate ρ. When β = 0.97, the
Andronov–Hopf bifurcation appears around ρ ≈ 0.053.
We have also performed a similar analysis for changes in the discount rate, as in
Figure 4. At ρ ≈ 0.053 we observe a similar Andronov–Hopf bifurcation. When
ρ < 0.053, we have converging oscillations, and smaller values of ρ lead to oscil-
lations of smaller frequency, as intuition would suggest. This result suggests that
not only technology matters, but the preferences of the planner play a role, too.
So, if the planner is sufficiently impatient (large ρ) then he will initially allocate
more labour to incremental innovations, allowing faster growth now and therefore
more consumption. However, because radical innovations will then come in smaller
amounts, and technological opportunity will be gradually exhausted, at some point
the planner will have to increase the number of researchers in the radical innovations
sector in order to prevent economic stagnation. In the moment that enough techno-
logical opportunity will have been created, the planner will shift the workers again to
the incremental innovations sector to satisfy his impatience for consumption. In case
the discount rate is too large, the economy will never converge to the BGP because
the planner will be too quick in reallocating labour across the two R&D sectors.
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4 Conclusion
In this article we have analysed an R&D-based semi-endogenous growth model
where technological advances depend on the available amount of technological op-
portunity. The model distinguishes two types of innovations which have different
impacts on the evolution of knowledge: incremental innovations provide direct in-
creases to the stock of knowledge but reduce the technological opportunity which
is required for further incremental innovations, whereas radical innovations serve to
renew this opportunity. Hence, technological opportunity behaves like a renewable
resource. Even though the basic idea belongs to Olsson [33], we have substantially
generalized his framework in order to attain direct comparability with established
R&D-based growth models by Romer [36] and Jones [21].
We have analysed the model for its growth implications, leading to three key
observations. First, it suggests that long-run growth along the lines of Jones [21],
Kortum [26], and Segerstrom [38] requires external returns to radical innovations to
be at least as strong as those of incremental innovations. Furthermore, if one expects
the returns to radical and incremental innovations to come with approximately the
same output elasticity, then standard, analytically more tractable models (e.g. Jones
[21]) will be sufficient to estimate the growth effects of technological progress. If,
however, one presumes that it is unlikely that this condition holds, then our model
can help in deriving relevant long-run predictions. For example, as we have shown,
economic growth can easily come to a halt if technological opportunity is not re-
newed sufficiently fast. This could be the case if technology spillovers in the radical
innovations sector are too small.
The second novel result is related to the transition dynamics. Focusing on the
case where returns to radical innovations are equal to those of incremental ones, we
have demonstrated that, even though the long-run implications of this model will
then be analogous to Jones [21] and Segerstrom [38], the transition need not. We
have solved for the transition dynamics of the social planner allocation in our model,
indicating the conditions when it need not be monotonic. Indeed, endogenous oscil-
lations and limit cycles are obtained for a wide range of plausible parameter values.
We therefore suggest that technological opportunity, as characterized here, can be a
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source of endogenous cycles even without uncertainty or an inefficient allocation.
Thirdly, we have also demonstrated that there are two reasons why the decentral-
ized market outcome differs from the social planner allocation in our model. One,
monopolistic mark-ups charged by intermediate goods producers slow down the ac-
cumulation of capital and imply a too high consumption to capital ratio (and income
to capital ratio) in the decentralized equilibrium. Two, the allocation of labour be-
tween the innovation sector and the final goods sector may differ in the centralized
and decentralized solution since (i) the final goods producers do not internalize their
effect on the evolution of aggregate technology, (ii) the social planner, as opposed
to intermediate goods producers, does not extract monopoly rents, and (iii) in the
decentralized equilibrium, stronger complementarity between intermediate inputs
reduces the wages in that sector and thus makes more workers willing to work in the
final goods sector.
As a final note we would like to advocate the idea of technological opportu-
nity as a concept which is extremely useful for the description of the evolution of
technology. This is a rather novel, intuitive idea which still lacks sound empirical
justification, and thus a thorough empirical analysis is certainly needed.
Supplementary material
Supplementary material is available online at the OUP website.
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Appendix to
Technological opportunity, long-run growth, and convergence 1
By Jakub Growiec and Ingmar Schumacher
1 Evidence Supporting the Setup
There exists a large amount of anecdotal evidence which can be used to support the
view that technological opportunity is a relevant concept and that the distinction
between incremental and radical innovations is helpful for the proper understand-
ing of technological change across centuries (cf. Olsson [8]). Let us present a few
illustrative examples.
Example 1. In 1814, Joseph Nie´pce invented the first photo camera. It took 8
hours to take one picture. This certainly must be viewed as a radical innovation but
it was not yet a useful technology for increasing the productivity of the economy.
However, in 1851 the exposure time was reduced to 2-3 seconds, in 1888 the first
roll-film was developed, and in 1941 – the color film. One and a half century later,
we have digital cameras which are available at prices accessible to the general
public and pictures can be printed at home. It is clear that the small improvements
to the photo camera, in our terminology the incremental innovations, ought to
be viewed as the crucial steps for spreading the technology into the economy,
whereas the radical innovation of Joseph Nie´pce was the one which opened up the
opportunity for these incremental innovations.
1Jakub Growiec, Institute of Econometrics, Warsaw School of Economics, Poland, and Eco-
nomic Institute, National Bank of Poland; e-mail: jakub.growiec@sgh.waw.pl. Ingmar Schu-
macher, IPAG Business School, 184 boulevard Saint-Germain, 75006 Paris, France, and Depart-
ment of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique, Paris, France; e-mail: ingmar.schumacher@ipag.fr.
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Example 2. The first locomotive was developed in 1804 by Richard Trevithick.
It was the first steam-powered locomotive, and therefore ought to be considered
a radical innovation. However, it was too heavy and even broke the very own
rails it was supposed to travel on. Compared to this, the incremental innovations
following that radical innovation were tremendous. In 1814 came the first steam
locomotive that was actually able to travel, although at only 6 km/h; today the
Maglev, the high-speed magnetic train, travels at more than 550 km/h. Again,
the initial idea of Richard Trevithick was the one opening up the possibilities for
the incremental innovations, whereas the radical innovation proved useless for
improving productivity.
Example 3. In 1928, Alexander Fleming had, by accident, left a Staphylococcus
plate culture lying in the warm cellar. Several days later, upon reminding himself
of the forgotten plate culture, he noticed that there was a blue-green colored mold
destroying the bacteria. He called this mold Penicillin. It was however too weak
and unstable to provide a useful means of destroying bacterial infections in hu-
mans. Only subsequent research by Chain, Florey and Heatley developed the kind
of Penicillin which now saves human lives throughout the world. As Sir Henry
Harris had aptly put it: “Without Fleming, no Chain; without Chain, no Florey;
without Florey, no Heatley; without Heatley, no Penicillin.”
Similar stories can be told about the invention of the first battery by Alessandro
Volta in 1799, the first champagne by Dom Pe´rignon in 1670, nylon by DuPont
in 1928, the steam engine, the airplane, electricity, and many more. What can be
seen here is that we view radical innovations as spanning a broader class of inno-
vations than for example General Purpose Technologies. They all have one thing
in common: opening up opportunities for small improvements, for incremental in-
novations that help make the technology accessible, practical and operative. With-
out the radical innovations being able to open up new opportunities, there would
be no place for incremental innovations. And without doubt, in a considerable if
not exhaustive number of cases, it were the incremental innovations which really
proved to be useful for economic purposes.
A radical innovation is usually the first one in a series of innovations. It opens up a
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new line of research. It should not be mistaken, however, with an early innovation:
for example, the early invention of gunpowder in ancient China did not open up
many opportunities for developments, while the invention of MP3 music encoding
did so despite being quite recent.
Our understanding of the evolution of technological knowledge differs from the
articles basing on combinatorial calculations (Romer [10]; Weitzman [11]). We do
not consider the potential for technological change as the number of possible ways
to combine ideas. For example, 20 objects may be combined in 220 = 1, 048, 576
ways. Given an enormous number like this, papers in this vein conclude that
there are no practical limits to technological change. However, why should we
combine every possible idea? Intuitively, it seems more likely that just the “non-
dominated” technologies, those on the technological frontier (Caselli and Cole-
man [2]), are improved. As Poincare´ observed: “To create consists precisely in
not making useless combinations.” So, we suggest that only ideas on the technol-
ogy frontier may be usefully improved, an assumption which this article shares
with Kortum [6] and Olsson [8]. The implication is that incremental innovations
would by themselves come to a halt if the technological frontier were not con-
stantly pushed ahead by radical innovations.
So, how does technological opportunity increase? What qualifies as a radical
innovation? We suggest that a radical innovation arises whenever a new class of
known phenomena (physical, biological, chemical, etc.) is found to have econom-
ically useful applications. For example, “[f]or thousands of years, silicon dioxide
provided utility mainly as sand on the beach, but now it delivers utility through
the myriad of goods that depend on computer chips” (Jones [4]). Conclusively,
we believe that the flows of radical innovations are related to the stock of existing
knowledge. The larger the existing knowledge base, the more discoveries will be
transformed into radical innovations.
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2 Technological Opportunity and the Evolution of
Knowledge
2.1 The Relationship Between Inventions
This section demonstrates our version of the set-theoretic approach to modeling
ideas put forward by Olsson [7], [8]. This approach should be understood as
a metaphor of the evolution of human thought in reality. Consequently, all the
concepts defined precisely in this metaphorical world (such as technological op-
portunity) are supposed to have real-world analogues. Figure 1 illustrates the
set-theoretic approach in a two-dimensional case.
We start with the comforting assumption that any kind of idea can potentially be
utilized. The space of ideas (known and unknown) is the whole Rn space, where
n ∈ N reflects the (large) number of dimensions in which ideas are characterized.
In this world of ideas, the standard Pythagorean distance metric d : Rn×Rn → R
is assumed to apply: d(x, y) =
√∑n
i=1(xi − yi)2. We use the Lebesgue measure
λ to describe the volume of all Lebesgue measurable subsets of Rn.
The technology set A ⊂ Rn is assumed to be a compact and connected set en-
compassing all ideas that are already known. We write λ(A) = A. The convex
hull of the technology set, P ⊃ A, typically consisting of both some known and
some unknown ideas, will be called the technological paradigm.
Within the technology set, there is the set of ignorance, called 0 ∈ A, which can
be thought of as consisting of some natural ability and instinct, devoid of any
systematic knowledge. The set of ignorance has a small but nevertheless positive
measure, λ(0) > 0. It is assumed that in the beginning of time, the technology set
A ⊂ Rn is comprised of the set 0 only.
Discoveries form a set D = {d1, d2, ..., dm}, D ∈ Rn\co(A) with m ∈ N, of
isolated points away from the current paradigm (i.e., the convex hull of the current
technology set). At this point, we choose to link the amount of discoveries made
at a given moment in time to the current technology level A – i.e. to the current
measure of the technology set. In principle, one should allow either for increasing,
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Figure 1: The set-theoretic approach illustrated.
constant, or decreasing returns to scale here (IRTS, CRTS, DRTS, respectively).
It turns out however that only the DRTS case does not lead to explosive dynamics.
Therefore, we write D ∝ #D, where D = g(A) ≥ 0, with g′(A) ≥ 0 having
DRTS.
A radical innovation is one that connects points on the boundary of the tech-
nology set A with discoveries, and so the radical innovation set is given by
R = ⋃i=1,2,...,r I[xi, di], ∀i(xi ∈ bdy(A), di ∈ D), and r ∈ N with r ≤ m. Please
note that the measures of the radical innovation set as well as of the discoveries
set are always zero, and thus radical innovations and discoveries cannot provide
additions to the measure of the technology set: like in Olsson [8], they do not
improve technology directly.
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In the subsequent sections, we will be also interested in the measure of the convex
hull of the radical innovation set. We shall write R = λ(co(R)).
The possibilities for further technological developments are collected in the tech-
nological opportunity set B ⊂ Rn. Formally, this set is comprised of all ideas
that belong to the paradigm (convex hull of the technology set) but do not belong
to the technology set itself: B = co(A)\A. Of course, if the technology set is
convex (A = co(A)), then the technological opportunity set is empty. We shall
denote the extent of technological opportunity by B = λ(B).
Developments combining ideas from the boundary of the technology set are grou-
ped together in the incremental innovation set C ⊆ B. The inclusion C ⊆ B
means that one can work out gradual developments only if the opportunity for
them already exists. As already indicated before, this is an assumption where
Olsson [8] and this article clearly depart from the usual modeling practice a` la
Romer [9], Aghion and Howitt [1], or Jones [3].
The “incremental”, gradual nature of incremental innovations is captured by as-
suming that the distance between two combined ideas im, in ∈ bdy(A) cannot
exceed some given constant d¯: d(im, in) ≤ d¯. In addition, a new idea can only
be a convex combination of already known ideas, i = αim + (1 − α)in with
0 < α < 1, where the new idea incrementally expands the technology set, such
that i ∈ co(A)\A. We denote the measure of the incremental innovation set by
C = λ(C).
Consistently with these assumptions, it follows that technological opportunity gets
depleted by incremental innovations but renewed by radical innovations: B˙ =
−C + R. The technology set is increased by incremental innovations and is not
altered by radical innovations: A˙ = C.
One interesting question that remains is whether with larger technological oppor-
tunity it becomes increasingly easier to produce incremental innovations, or, on
the contrary, it becomes harder to produce them. We are not aware of any em-
pirical evidence on this, but for the sake of plausibility, we shall concentrate on
the DRTS case here. Again, it is the unique case that does not lead to explosive
dynamics.
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When constructing our model, we shall also make the usual assumption that each
individual in the population of size L splits her fixed time endowment (1 = `Y +
`A) between working, `Y , searching for radical innovations, (1− u)`A, and doing
incremental R&D, u`A. This assumption allows us to clarify the evolution of
the measures of the sets as follows: B˙ = −C(u`AL,B) + R((1 − u)`AL,A);
A˙ = C(u`AL,B).
2.2 Detailed specification of the set-theoretic approach
We shall now present our set-theoretic approach to modeling technical change in
a more rigorous and compact form. This approach has been first formulated by
Olsson [7] and then refined by the same author in Olsson [8]. Here we have added
in more structure (Lebesgue measure, Pythagorean metric, point of ignorance,
R&D difficulty).
Definition 1 The idea space is the Rn space, where n ∈ N is predefined, together
with the Lebesgue measure λ defined on all Borel subsets of Rn, and the usual
Pythagorean metric d : Rn × Rn → R defined by d(x, y) =√∑ni=1(xi − yi)2.
Definition 2 The technology set A ⊂ Rn is a compact and connected set such
that 0 ∈ A.
Please note that the origin 0 ∈ Rn is labeled also the point of ignorance; the set of
ignorance is a ball of some small diameter ¯ > 0, surrounding the point 0.
Definition 3 The technology level is the Lebesgue measure of the technology set,
λ(A) > 0.
Definition 4 The paradigm P ⊂ Rn is the convex hull of the technology set:
P ≡ co(A).
The paradigm is a compact, connected and convex set. We also have that 0 ∈ P ,
A ⊂ P , and λ(P) ≥ λ(A) > 0.
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Definition 5 The technological opportunity set B ⊂ Rn is (the closure of) the
set of ideas that belong to the paradigm but do not belong to the technology set:
B = cl(P\A).
The technological opportunity set is a compact set, and 0 /∈ B.
Definition 6 The level of technological opportunity is the measure of the techno-
logical opportunity set λ(B).
Definition 7 The technology frontier Z is the set of ideas that belong both to the
technology set and to the technological opportunity set: Z ≡ A ∩ B.
The technology frontier is a compact boundary set (intZ = ∅, λ(Z) = 0).
Definition 8 The R&D difficulty is the distance of the technology frontier to
the origin: δ¯ ≡ dist(Z, 0). If the technology frontier is empty, we put δ¯ =
dist(bdyA, 0).
Definition 9 The incremental innovation set is a subset of the technological op-
portunity set, C ⊂ B, with C ∩ Z 6= ∅ if Z 6= ∅.
Definition 10 The discoveries set is a finite set of isolated points outside the
paradigm: D = {d1, d2, ..., dm}, D ∈ Rn\P , and m ∈ N.
The discoveries set is a compact boundary set, with intD = ∅, λ(D) = 0.
Definition 11 The radical innovation set is a set of closed intervals, connecting
points on the boundary of the technology set with discoveries:
R = ⋃i=1,2,...,r I[xi, di], where ∀i(xi ∈ bdyA, di ∈ D), and r ∈ N with r ≤ m.
The radical innovation set is a compact boundary set, intR = ∅, λ(R) = 0.
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2.3 Evolution of the Sets Over Time
We assume that in a period of time of an infinitesimal length ε > 0,
Aε = A ∪ C ∪R,
i.e. newly invented technologies add to the technology set. It follows that the
paradigm is shifted by radical innovations; technological opportunity is dimin-
ished by incremental innovations and extended by radical innovations, and the
technology frontier is pushed forward:
Pε = co(Aε),
Bε = cl(Pε\Aε) = cl
(B\C)︸ ︷︷ ︸
extraction
∪ (Pε\P)︸ ︷︷ ︸
paradigm shift
 ,
Zε = Aε ∩ Bε.
Bearing in mind that the radical innovation set is of measure zero but its convex
hull is (typically) of positive measure, we find that the technology level and the
level of technological opportunity evolve in the following way:
λ(Aε) = λ(A) + λ(C),
λ(Bε) = λ(B)− λ(C) + λ(Pε\P).
The last “paradigm shift” term is driven by radical innovations in R only. Please
note that only incremental innovations have the power to increase the measure of
the technology set.
R&D difficulty evolves as follows:
δ¯ε = dist(Zε, 0) ≥ δ¯.
This set-theoretic approach is one way of providing a foundation of the dynamic
equations of our model, summarized in the system of equations
A˙t = δ(ut`AtLt)
βBµt , (1)
B˙t = −δ(ut`AtLt)βBµt︸ ︷︷ ︸
incremental innovations
+ γ((1− ut)`AtLt)βAνt︸ ︷︷ ︸
radical innovations
. (2)
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